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Procedure in Federal Courts-Assessment of Penal:ty 
for Appeal Taken Only for Delay 
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In an appeal1 from a federal district court verdict and judgment 
in a wrongful death action, appellees requested that damages be 
assessed against the appellant because the appeal to the court of 
appeals was sued out merely for delay. The appellees' request 
was made under a rule of court2 which is common to all 11 circuit 
courts of appeals3 and is found in the rules of the United States 
Supreme Court4 and many state appellate court rules.5 
1 American Hardware Ins. Co. v. Van Vick, 268 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1959). 
2 "In all cases where an appeal shall delay the proceedings on the 
judgment of the inferior court, and shall appear to have been sued 
out merely for delay, damages at a ,rate not exceeding 10 per cent 
shall be awarded on the amount of the judgment." 5th CIR. R. 30. 
1 D.C. CIR. R. 23. 
1st CIR. R. 32. 
2nd CIR. R. 26. 
3rd CIR. R. 33. 
4th CIR. R. 20. 
5th CIR. R. 30. 
6th CIR. R. 25. 
7th CIR. R. 26. 
8th CIR. R. 21. 
9th CIR. R. 24. 
10th CIR. R. 25. 
4 Supreme Court Rule 56. 
5 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 814 (1940). 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 957, R. 26. 
GA. CODE § 6-1801 (1933). 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 57 (50) (1957). 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211, § 10 (1931). 
MISS. CODE ANN. § § 1971, 1972 (1942). 
MO. REV. STAT. § 512, 80 (1949). 
New Mexico-Supreme Court Rules, R. 17-3. 
OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.35 (Anderson 1953). 
ORE. CIV. LAWS ANN. § 19.160 (1953). 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 438 (1948). 
WASH. REV. CODE§ 251.23(3) (1953). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court declared a rule similar to the one 
under discussion to be unconstitutional in Moore v. Herron, 17 Neb. 
697, 24 N.W. 425 (1885). In addition, note 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1925) 
which provides for assessment of damages for delay after an appeal 
to a higher court has been denied. This section also punishes ap-
peals made for vexatious and frivolous reasons. See Lowe v. Willacy, 
239 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1956). Also there is a provision in the patent 
laws, 25 U.S.C. § 285 (1952), whidh provides that in exceptional 
cases, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the injured 
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The Federal Judiciary Act of 17896 contained a provlSlon 
penalizing appeals taken only for purposes of delay, and the 
uniform rules for circuit courts of appeaF adopted in 1891 also 
contained a section providing for assessment of damages against 
the appellant in cases of appeals sued out only to delay proceed-
ings on the judgment in the lower court. 
In the instant case, a wrongful death action, the court held 
that the appeal was not sued out merely for purposes of delay 
although the court did find that there was little question but what 
the verdict and the judgment below should be affirmed. The 
court expressed a reluctance to award damages for delay largely 
because of the "cogently put and earnestly argued brief of the 
appellant."8 
There would seem to be some reluctance on the part of courts 
of appeal to impose the penalty for delay. Only three times since 
1940 have damages for delay been awarded, although the issue 
has been brought up many times.9 
The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit in Traders & Gen-
eral Ins. Co. v. McClary 10 found that the appellants' main basis 
for appeal was "purely factual" and the court further found that 
the appeal was "so clearly without foundation on the present 
record as to call for no discussion." Yet, the court said without 
further explanation that it was not satisfied that the appeal was 
sued out merely for delay. 
What then will satisfy the courts of appeal that an appeal 
is made out only for purpose of delay? The Court of Appeal for 
the Eighth Circuit in May Department Stores v. Reynolds11 said 
that since the opinion of the court in a prior case had, for all 
practical purposes, settled the law in that particular area, an award 
of damages for delay was warranted. Only $250 was granted, 
party in cases of delay or of vexatious or frivolous appeal. See 
Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Ruby Lighting Co., 191 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 
1951), and also a more recent case, Kemart v. Printing Arts Research 
Lab. Inc., 269 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1959). 
6 Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 23, 1 Stat. 85 (1789). 
7 Rule 30, 150 Fed. xxxv (1891). 
s American Hardware Ins. Co. v. Van Vick, supra note 1, at 184. 
9 The Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit has considered the ques-
tion eight times since 1940 and has awarded damages twice. 
10 241 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1957). 
11 140 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1944). 
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however, instead of the maximum possible award of ten per cent 
of the judgment in the lower court.12 
In 1950, again in the Eighth Circuit, damages for delay were 
awarded in the case of Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Feutz.13 
The court said the contentions of the appellant were wh-0lly with-
out merit and awarded damages of $2,230 to the appellee - again, 
however, a sum less than ten per cent of the judgment below. 
The court's reasons for assessing the penalty included: 
1. The appellant was given every opportunity to present every 
conceivable defense in the trial court. 
2. In deciding against granting a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict as requested by appellant, the trial court judge pre-
pared an elaborate opinion covering every contention made by the 
appellant in the trial court and in the court of appeals. 
Nash v. Nash14 in the Fifth Circuit is one of the few cases 
wherein the court actually considered in the decision the advan-
tageous effect of the delay which had been gained by the appel-
lant. Here the enforcement of a judicial decree regarding a 
property settlement in a divorce suit was held up pending appeal. 
The court said the appeal was brought up entirely on technical 
objections and the appeal had no basis at all in the substantive 
law. Judgment was affirmed with damages for delay. 
Where will the courts draw the line in favor of the appellant? 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied damages for 
delay as requested by the appellee in National Surety Corp. v. 
Williams15 saying that "upon examining the record we are con-
vinced the appeal was taken in good faith." (Italics added) 
One reason for denying recovery for the appellee in South-
western Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lain16 was the submission of a brief 
by the appellant that was 139 pages long which was said to be 
one of several "indications of good faith" in taking the appeal. 
(Italics added) 
12 "In any case where an appeal has delayed proceedings on a judg-
ment appealed from and shall appear to have been taken merely 
for delay, damages not exceediig 10 per cent of the amount of the 
judgment, in addition to interest, may be awarded and added to 
the judgment." 8th CIR. R. 21. 
13 182 F.2d. 752 (8th Cir. 1950). 
14 234 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1956). 
lu 110 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1940). 
16 139 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1944). 
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Most courts are very reluctant to invoke the rule.17 The court 
in Mason v. Summer Lake Irrigation Dist.18 said the appeal could 
have warranted assessment of damages for delay, but the court 
would not do so since it had not assessed damages for delay in 
the past. The court did give warning that it would not hesitate 
to invoke the rule in the future, however.19 
If there is a shield which might protect the appellant in cases 
in which courts might question the motives and sincerity of the 
appeal, the armor is composed of earnestness of argument20 and 
vigorous and prompt prosecution of the appeal.21 
Earnestness and' vigorous prosecution should not be translated 
into zeal on the part of counsel solely to win a case. In Mass-
achusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Feutz,22 the court awarded 
damages for delay saying that the appellees ought not to be re-
quired to pay expenses attributable to the excessive zeal of counsel 
for the appellant. 
The reluctance of the courts to invoke the rule does indicate, 
however, that sincerity and hard work on the part of counsel as 
manifested in his oral argument and briefs will preclude any 
award of damages for delay. 
Sam Jensen '61 
